Third Party Tracking in the Mobile Ecosystem by Binns, Reuben et al.
Third Party Tracking in the Mobile Ecosystem
Reuben Binns, Ulrik Lyngs, Max Van Kleek, Jun Zhao, Timothy Libert∗, Nigel Shadbolt
Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford
*Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford
Oxford
reuben.binns|ulrik.lyngs|max.van.kleek|jun.zhao|nigel.shadbolt@cs.ox.ac.uk
timothy.libert@politics.ox.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
Third party tracking allows companies to identify users and track
their behaviour across multiple digital services. This paper presents
an empirical study of the prevalence of third-party trackers on
959,000 apps from the US and UK Google Play stores. We find that
most apps contain third party tracking, and the distribution of track-
ers is long-tailed with several highly dominant trackers accounting
for a large portion of the coverage. The extent of tracking also dif-
fers between categories of apps; in particular, news apps and apps
targeted at children appear to be amongst the worst in terms of the
number of third party trackers associated with them. Third party
tracking is also revealed to be a highly trans-national phenomenon,
with many trackers operating in jurisdictions outside the EU. Based
on these findings, we draw out some significant legal compliance
challenges facing the tracking industry.
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• Security and privacy→ Economics of security and privacy;
Software reverse engineering; •Applied computing→ Law; •Net-
works→ Mobile and wireless security;
KEYWORDS
privacy, tracking, behavioural advertising, mobile, android, static
analysis, data protection
ACM Reference Format:
Reuben Binns, Ulrik Lyngs, Max Van Kleek, Jun Zhao, Timothy Libert, Nigel
Shadbolt. 2018. Third Party Tracking in the Mobile Ecosystem. InWebSci
’18: 10th ACM Conference on Web Science, May 27–30, 2018, Amsterdam,
Netherlands. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 9 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/
3201064.3201089
1 INTRODUCTION
Billions of people use smartphones every day, generating vast
amounts of data about themselves. Much of the functionality af-
forded by these devices comes in the form of applications which de-
rive revenue frommonetising user data and displaying behaviourally
targeted advertising. Firms with the ability to collect such data have
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become a significant part of the digital economy [3], with the online
advertising industry earning $59.6 billion per year in the U.S. alone
[20].
This business model is primarily enabled through ‘third-party’
trackers [27], which track users via ‘first-party’ mobile applications,
whose developers embed their technology into application source
code. Such networks link activity across multiple apps to a single
user, and also link to their activities on other devices or mediums
like the web. This enables construction of detailed profiles about
individuals, which could include inferences about shopping habits,
socio-economic class or likely political opinions. These profiles can
then be used for a variety of purposes, from targeted advertising to
credit scoring and targeted political campaign messages.
This paper aims to provide a high-level empirical overview of the
extent of third party tracking on the mobile ecosystem. In particular,
we aim to answer the following:
(1) How are third party trackers distributed across apps on the
Google Play Store?1
(2) Which companies ultimately own these tracking technolo-
gies, and in which jurisdictions are they based?
(3) Do different trackers prevail amongst different genres of
apps?
Our motivation is to shed light on the status quo, in order that
future efforts to address and mitigate third party tracking can be
more informed and targeted.
2 BACKGROUND
We begin by introducing previous work on tracker detection meth-
ods, and on large-scale field studies of tracking on the web and
mobile. Then, to motivate some of the present analysis, we provide
an overview of existing approaches to addressing mobile tracking,
including end-user controls, OS provider rules, and legal regulation.
The shortcomings of the first two approaches have driven a re-
newed focus on the latter; by surveying the existing state of mobile
tracking, we aim to provide insights into the extent to which current
tracking activities may be affected by certain key data protection
regulations.
2.1 Detecting third party tracking at scale in
the wild
The third party tracking ecosystem has been studied on both the
web andmobile using a variety of methods. Large scale web tracking
studies detect third-party trackers by inspecting network traffic
associated with a website. Some approaches use crowd-sourcing
1We did not study the Apple iOS App Store because there are no equivalently scalable
iOS app collection and analysis methods
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(e.g. [36, 39]) while others use automated web crawlers (e.g. [15,
23, 32, 39]. In all cases, a small number of dominant trackers are
observed.
Several studies of third-party tracking have also been conducted
on mobile platforms [10, 36], using both dynamic and static detec-
tion methods. Dynamic methods, as in web-based tracking studies,
involve inspecting network traffic from the browser / device and
identifying any third party destinations that relate to tracking. One
common approach has been OS-level instrumentation, such as those
of TaintDroid [14], and AppTrace [29]. An alternative to low-level
OS instrumentation is to analyse all communications traffic trans-
mitted by an app whilst it is in use [31]. Other methods involve
unpacking an application’s source code (on Android systems, this
comes as an Android Application Package (APK)) and detecting use
of third-party tracking libraries [5, 8, 13, 24].
Other aspects of tracking have been studied, including the variety
of techniques that are used, from cookies [6, 15, 16] to fingerprinting
[2]. A more recent field study by Yu et al. provided a finer-grained
view into tracker behaviour, by classifying data being transmitted
to trackers as either ‘safe’ or ‘unsafe’ [39]. Another factor is the
permissions requested by an app, which constrain the kinds of
data a third party can obtain; longitudinal research has found that
Android apps request additional privacy-risking permissions on
average every three months [34].
The crossover between the mobile and web tracking ecosystem
has also attracted attention in recent research. Various comparisons
have shown that web and mobile tracking are different, both in
terms of the companies that operate on each environment [36],
and the specific kinds of personal information that are shared by
web and mobile versions of the same service [22]. In previous work
comparing 5,000 apps and 5,000 websites, it was found that while
certain companies dominate both environments, the overlap be-
tween top trackers is only partial, even for web and mobile versions
of the same service [9].
2.2 Existing approaches to addressing risks of
tracking
There are threemain approaches for addressing the risks of tracking;
end-user privacy controls, industry self-regulation, and traditional
legal regulation.
2.2.1 End-user privacy controls. Tracking exists on both the
web and on mobile apps, but web browsers have traditionally en-
abled end-users to control tracking via default browser settings or
through third party plugins. By contrast, no major smartphone plat-
form OS currently gives end-users the ability to block or otherwise
control third party tracking by apps (although tracker blocking is
available on mobile web browsers). The privacy settings are pri-
marily focused on app-by-app permissions, or permissions regard-
ing certain data types (e.g. location, contacts, etc.). While various
changes have been introduced like run-time permissions, and adver-
tising identifier controls [28], these do not address the distinction
between first party apps and third party trackers. More recently,
awareness-raising tools have been proposed which do reveal the
presence of third-parties. They make use of techniques including
reverse-engineering of app source code and network traffic analy-
sis [5, 8, 13, 14, 18, 29, 40], allowing identification of personal data
flows from apps to first and third parties. These tools have been
used to map data flows and display them to end-users [7, 11, 33, 37].
Such focus on third-party data collection, rather than app-level per-
missions, may be a more meaningful way to enact privacy choices.
However, until such controls are enabled by the OS providers, third
party tracking via apps remains largely invisible to end-users. This
is in contrast to the web, where millions of users make use of tracker
protection tools such as uBlock Origin or Ghostery.
2.2.2 Self-regulation by platforms. In response to the develop-
ment and proliferation of trackers, and the lack of wide-scale de-
ployment of effective end-user tracker controls, various efforts have
been made by mobile OS platform developers to address the risks.
Mobile application developers are required to follow the rules of the
app market providers in order for their apps to be listed [4]. Since
few consumers use multiple app stores on a single smartphone,
these platforms are in a stronger position to impose industry self-
regulation than browser vendors, because they have the ability to
effectively kick an application off the platform entirely.
Industry-led self-regulatory initiatives have thus far attempted
to strike a balance between protecting users from malicious be-
haviour and creating a relatively permissive environment. With
respect to smartphone operating systems, Apple and Google have
the power to exert varying degrees of control over the behaviour
of apps appearing in their default app stores. Thus far, both of
their respective developer agreements permit third-party tracking,
although certain user-protective practices are required, such as
collecting a replaceable advertising identifier (IDFA / AAID) rather
than the permanent device identifier.
More stringent action against third party tracking may also have
been held back by vested interests of the OS providers. Both Google
and Apple have historically had a stake in the digital advertising in-
dustry. Google own several tracker companies such as DoubleClick
and others. Apple used to take a cut of advertising revenue from ad
network trackers in iPhone apps, through the iADs program, but
this scheme ended in 2016.
2.2.3 Legal regulation. These self-regulatory efforts, such as
they are, sit alongside a variety of specific legal regulations with
varying levels of enforcement in different countries around the
world. Perhaps the most stringent and far-sighted of these is the
data protection legal regime in Europe. With updated rules incom-
ing this year in the form of the European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation, new enforcement powers including the issu-
ing of larger fines and scope for indefinitely suspending processing
may substantially curtail the activities of third party trackers.
For instance, the specific identities and purposes of third party
trackers will have to be made transparent to the data subject (i.e.
the user of the app); and special safeguards must be applied in
the case of children. While profiling of children is not outright
prohibited by the GDPR, the Article 29 Working Party (the EU body
responsible for providing guidance on data protection), advise that
organisations should ‘refrain from profiling them for marketing
purposes’.
Regarding transfer of data across borders, while existing require-
ments are not fundamentally different under the GDPR, transna-
tional data transfer is likely to receive additional scrutiny in light of
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the introduction of stronger enforcement powers. Under the exist-
ing regime, personal data is permitted to flow from one jurisdiction
to another, subject to compliance with certain conditions. The least
onerous condition is if the recipient organisation is based in a coun-
try whose existing data protection regime has been assessed by the
European Commission and deemed ‘adequate’. Otherwise, special
arrangements such as standard contractual clauses and binding
agreements between organisations in both jurisdictions may be
necessary in order to make cross-jurisdictional data flows legiti-
mate. Similar data flow agreements exist between other countries.
In some cases these are reciprocal (such as between the EU and
Andorra), while others are not (e.g., the Russian privacy regulator
allows personal data to flow from Russia to EU countries2, but the
reverse is not true).
Such cross-border rules and data ‘trade blocs’ have consequences
for the legal basis for third party tracking when tracking companies,
app developers, app stores and end-users are located in different
jurisdictions. While the transfer of data from people residing in the
EU to countries whose data protection regime is deemed inadequate
could be legitimate in principle, more onerous conditions would
need to be met. As such, any efforts to assess the legality of current
practices must consider the extent to which tracking occurs across
borders.
3 DATA COLLECTION & METHODOLOGY
3.1 Play Store Indexing and App Discovery
The first step was to identify available apps. We programmatically
identified popular search terms in the Play Store by autocompleting
all character strings of up to a length of five, and then issued each
search term to get a list of apps, ranked by popularity [17]. The
identified apps were then downloaded using the gplaycli [25], a
command line tool for interacting with the Play Store.
3.1.1 Static analysis method. An Android Package Kit (APK) is
an Android file format that contains all resources needed by an
app to run on a device. Upon download, each APK was unpacked
and decoded using APKTool [35] to obtain the app’s assets, in
particular its icon, bytecode (in the DEX format) and metadata (in
XML format). Finally, permission requests were parsed from the
XML and hosts were found in the bytecode using a simple regex3.
3.1.2 Mapping hostnames to known tracker companies. While
this static analysis process effectively identified references to hosts
in the APKs, it did not provide a means of mapping them to com-
panies, let alone selecting only those companies who are in fact
engaged in tracking. A large number of the hostnames found in
the static code analysis refer to a wide range of benign external
resources which are not necessarily engaged in tracking. In order
to isolate only those engaged in tracking, we combined two lists
of trackers derived from previous research. One list is compiled
by the Web X-Ray project [23]. It maps third party web tracking
domains to companies that own them, as well as parent-subsidiary
2https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2017/08/16/russian-privacy-regulator-\
adds-countries-list-nations-sufficient-privacy-protections/
3We note that this method has the inherent problem that we cannot confirm if bytecode
relating to or referencing such hosts is ever called. More sophisticated static analysis
methods might better distinguish but this is left for future work. The regex used to
identify hosts in the bytecode is available on osf.io/4nu9e
relationships. The second list is compiled from previous research by
the authors of the present paper [9, 38], which also maps domains
to companies, and companies to their owners, but incorporates
mobile app-centric trackers which are missing from web-oriented
tracker lists. An example of domain-company ownership in the re-
sulting aggregated list is shown in Figure 1, and parent-subsidiary
relationship in Figure 2.
Host names in the tracker lists were shortened to 2-level domains
using the python library tldextract4 (e.g. for ‘subdomain.example.com’,
the domain name ‘example’ and top-level domain suffix ‘.com’ were
kept and any subdomains were omitted). Tracker hosts were then
matched to hosts identified in app bytecode with a regular expres-
sion which excludedmatches that was followed by a dot or an alpha-
betic character (matching ‘google.com’ to ‘google.com/somepath’
but not ‘google.com.domain’ or ‘google.coming’).
3.2 Data analysis
Most of the data analysis was conducted in R, using RStudio5.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Numbers of tracker hosts in apps
The distribution of number of tracker hosts per appwas highly right-
skewed (see Figure 3). Gini inequality coefficient was 0.44. Across
all analyzed apps (n = 959,426), the median number of tracker hosts
included in the bytecode of an app was 10. 90.4% of apps included
at least one, and 17.9% more than twenty.
4.2 Numbers of distinct tracker companies
behind hosts
The distribution of number of distinct tracker companies (at the
lowest subsidiary level) behind the hosts in an app was similarly
right-skewed (see Figure 4). The median number of companies was
5, 90.4% of apps included hosts associated with at least one company,
and 17.4% with more than ten companies.
There were 13 apps for which our analysis identified 30 or more
different tracking companies referred to via hosts in the bytecode.
In some cases, these high numbers can be explained by the particu-
lar function of the app; for instance, some of these apps integrate
multiple different services into one app (e.g. ‘Social Networks All
in One’); in such cases, any tracking domains associated with those
integrated services will be identified by our method. For others,
mostly gaming apps, the high numbers of trackers serve no obvi-
ous function other than the usual kinds of behaviourally targeted
advertising and analytics.
Rather than simply counting number of companies, we can query
the proportion of apps containing hosts associated with specific
companies. As illustrated in Figure 2, however, many companies
have been acquired by larger parent or holding companies, such as
Alphabet. The result of grouping by ’root parent’ the percentages
of apps which include hosts associated with specific companies is
shown in Table 1.
4https://github.com/john-kurkowski/tldextract
5Analysis scripts plus data are available via the Open Science Framework at osf.io/
4nu9e. For access to the full data set, contact the authors.
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Figure 1: Example of domain-company ownership. The domainAdmobi.us is owned by the companyAdMobius, which is owned
by the parent company Lotame.
Figure 2: Example of parent-subsidiary company ownership (domains omitted). Flurry is owned by Yahoo, which is owned by
Oath, which is owned by Verizon (the ‘root parent’).
Median Q1 Q3 >20 hosts No hosts
10 5 18 17.9% 9.6%
Figure 3: Histogram and descriptive statistics for number of
tracker hosts per app (free apps on the Google Play store).
4.3 Company prevalence by genre
The Google Play store metadata divides apps into 49 different gen-
res (no less than 17 of these are subcategories of games, e.g. ’Casino
Games’ and ’Adventure Games’). To provide a high-level analy-
sis, we grouped these genres into 8 more succinct ’super genres’
Median Q1 Q3 >10 companies No companies
5 3 9 17.4% 9.6%
Figure 4: Number of distinct tracker companies behindhosts
in apps (free apps on the Google Play store).
(by e.g. clustering all game genres, plus the genres ’Comics’, ’En-
tertainment’, ’Sports’ and ’Video Players’ into a single ’Games &
Entertainment’ category6). In addition, given concern of in particu-
lar tracking of children[1], we created a super genre consisting of
6See osf.io/4nu9e for details of this grouping.
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Root parent % apps Subsidiary % apps Country
Alphabet 88.44 Google 87.57 US
Google APIs 67.51 US
DoubleClick 60.85 US
Google
Analytics
39.42 US
Google Tag
Manager
33.88 US
Adsense 30.12 US
Firebase 19.20 US
Admob 14.67 US
YouTube 9.51 US
Blogger 0.46 US
Facebook 42.55 Facebook 42.54 US
Liverail 1.03 US
Lifestreet <0.01 US
Twitter 33.88 Twitter 30.94 US
Crashlytics 5.10 US
Mopub 2.51 US
Verizon 26.27 Yahoo 20.82 US
Flurry 6.28 US
Flickr 1.37 US
Tumblr 1.22 US
Millennialmedia 0.71 US
Verizon 0.11 US
AOL 0.06 US
Intowow <0.01 US
One By AOL <0.01 US
Brightroll <0.01 US
Gravity
Insights
<0.01 US
Microsoft 22.75 Microsoft 22.11 US
Bing 0.12 US
LinkedIn 20.62 US
Amazon 17.91 Amazon Web
Services
11.57 US
Amazon 7.72 US
Amazon
Marketing
Services
1.73 US
Alexa <0.01 US
Unitytechnologies 5.78 Unitytechnologies 5.78 US
Chartboost 5.45 Chartboost 5.45 US
Applovin 3.95 Applovin 3.95 US
Cloudflare 3.85 Cloudflare 3.85 US
Opera 3.20 Adcolony 3.12 US
Admarvel 0.09 US
Table 1: The most prevalent root parent tracking companies
and their subsidiaries (full list available on osf.io/4nu9e).
Genre K
∑
K
Productivity & Tools 0.14 5.5
Games & Entertainment 0.13 5.41
Health & Lifestyle 0.1 5.5
Communication & Social 0.09 5.29
Art & Photography 0.09 5.12
Family 0.04 4.33
News 0.03 4.5
Education 0.03 5.42
Music 0.02 5.24
Table 2: K distances between tracker rankings for each genre
compared to all apps (K), and sum of pairwise distances be-
tween each genre and every other genre (
∑
K).
apps included in one of the Google Play store’s ‘family’ categories.7
For each super genre, we reran the company analysis, which re-
vealed some important differences between the nature of tracking
by genre.
First, there are differences in the number of distinct tracking com-
panies associated with apps from different genres. Figure 5 shows
the number of apps in each super genre, and descriptive statistics of
number of distinct tracker companies associated with apps within
each. News and Family apps have the highest median number of
tracker companies associated with them, and over 20% of apps in
the News, Family, and Games & Entertainment super genres are
linked to more than ten tracker companies. Meanwhile, the lowest
median number of trackers are found within Productivity & Tools,
Education, Communication & Social, and Health & Lifestyle apps,
and over 10% of Productivity & Tools, Education and Communication
& Social apps have no trackers at all.
Second, there are differences in which particular trackers are
associated with apps from each super genre. By comparing rank-
ings for each, we can see the extent to which different trackers
dominate each super genre. In addition to comparing the difference
in rankings for any given tracker, we use an overall distance metric,
the Kendall tau distance, in order to measure the extent to which
rankings differ between super genres [21].
The Kendall Tau distance may be defined as:
K(τ1,τ2) = ∑{i, j }∈P K¯i, j (τ1,τ2)
where:
(1) ”P” is the set of unordered pairs of distinct elements in τ1
and τ2
(2) K¯i, j (τ1,τ2) = 0 if ”i” and ”j” are in the same order in τ1 and
τ2
(3) K¯i, j (τ1,τ2) = 1 if ”i” and ”j” are in the opposite order in τ1
and τ2.
In this context, ”P” is the set of unordered pairs of trackers (e.g.
‘DoubleClick’ and ‘AdChina’), in one genre ranking τ1 (e.g. ‘Games’)
7All apps on the Google Play store have an ordinary genre classification, but some
apps are in classified into one of the Play store’s family genres.
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Super genre # apps Med. Q1 Q3 >10 None
News 26281 7 4 11 29.9% 6.5%
Family 8930 7 4 11 28.3% 7.2%
Games & Entertainment 291952 6 4 10 24.5% 7.3%
Art & Photography 27593 6 4 10 16.8% 3.6%
Music 65099 6 4 8 13.5% 4.1%
Health & Lifestyle 163837 5 3 8 15.4% 9.0%
Communication & Social 39637 5 2 8 16.2% 13.4%
Education 79730 5 2 8 13.3% 11.9%
Productivity & Tools 265297 5 2 8 11.9% 13.5%
(a)
Figure 5: Descriptive statistics (a) and histograms (b) of num-
ber of distinct tracker companies behind hosts referenced in
apps, grouped by super genre.
and another genre ranking τ2 (e.g. ‘News’).K is based on the number
of discordant pairs between τ1 and τ2, where a higher K indicates
greater distance.
We find that the Productivity & Tools and Games & Entertain-
ment categories exhibit the biggest differences in ranking of trackers
compared to the overall ranking of trackers across the whole Play
Store, while the ranking of trackers in the Music category is the
closest to the overall ranking (see Table 2).
In addition to calculating the distance between the rankings
of each genre and the rankings for the entire Play Store, we also
calculated the distances between each distinct pair of genres and
summed them to get an idea of the overall distance of a single
genre from every other genre. When considering the distance in
tracker rankings from the tracker rankings of all other categories,
Productivity & Tools and Health & Lifestyle appear to be the biggest
outliers; the top 20 trackers in the former include companies not
present in the top 20 for all apps, like Mapbox (rank #64 across all
apps) as well as Chinese companies Alibaba and Baidu.
Figure 6: Number of distinct countries inwhich tracker com-
panies behind hosts in an app (free apps on the Google Play
store) are based.
Country # apps present % apps
U.S. 865369 90.2%
China 48451 5.1%
Norway 30674 3.2%
Russia 24889 2.6%
Germany 24773 2.6%
Singapore 19323 2.0%
UK 14451 1.5%
Austria 4754 0.5%
South Korea 3366 0.4%
Japan 1801 0.2%
Table 3: Apps including at least one tracker associated with
a subsidiary or root parent within a given country.
4.4 Country differences
We also analysed the prevalence of countries in which the tracker
companies are based (including both subsidiary and root parent
level; see Table 3). Just over 90% of all apps contained at least one
tracker owned by a company based in the United States. China,
Norway, Russia, Germany, Singapore, and the United Kingdom
were the next most common destinations. The median number of
unique countries associated with the companies referred to in an
app was 1 (see Figure 6).
We also calculated the country prevalence figures on a genre-
by-genre basis. While the US remained the most prevalent in every
case, (between 86-96%), the prevalence rankings for other countries
differed by super genre. For instance, UK-based trackers were the
second-most prevalent in ‘Art & Photography’, despite being only
7th overall.
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5 DISCUSSION
We begin by discussing the limitations of our data collection meth-
ods. Next we consider some differences between tracking on web-
sites and on mobile apps, and finally we draw out implications for
the regulatory approaches outlined in section 2.2.3.
5.1 Limitations of data collection methods
There are several limitations to our tracker detection methods.
First, it is incomplete; our knowledge base of tracker domain to
company mappings is limited to those trackers which have been
discovered in the course of previous research (namely [9, 23, 38]).
While these lists were compiled in a systematic way, focusing on
the most prevalent tracking domains, including the entire long tail
of less prevalent domains might change the results reported. The
inclusion and exclusion criteria for what constitutes a ‘tracker’ are
also open to debate; the list compiled in prior works, and relied
on here, defines a third-party tracker as ‘an entity that collects
data about users from first-party websites and / or apps, in order
to link such data together to build a profile about the user’, but
the definition and its application are debateable.8 Another issue is
that without dynamic network traffic analysis of all apps, including
successful man-in-the-middle proxying and ability to interpret the
data payloads, we cannot confirm precisely what data is sent to each
tracker. Finally, different trackers serve different purposes; some
facilitate targeted advertising, while others are used for analytics.
Without further fine-grained distinctions between such purposes,
the figures presented here do not represent the full nuance and
variety of third party tracking and its impacts.
5.2 Web vs. Mobile
Previous large-scale studies of tracking have largely focused on
the web. The distribution model of the web allows measurement
of tracking to scale in a way that the model for smartphone app
distribution does not; web services are delivered in a standardised
way through a browser which can easily be automated. As a re-
sult, large-scale web tracking studies typically include millions of
sites. By contrast, the largest smartphone app tracking study to our
knowledge at the time of writing is derived from network traffic
detected by the Lumen app, which includes the data flows of 14,599
apps installed on Lumen user’s devices [30]. While such crowd-
sourced methods have many advantages in terms of the granularity
of the data flows and ecological validity, at best they scale to tens
of thousands of apps. By contrast, our method is scalable to hun-
dreds of thousands of apps (indeed, our dataset of apps is close to a
million).
5.3 Implications for tracker regulation
While the distribution of trackers across apps is of general interest
from a privacy and data protection regulation perspective, we focus
here on several particular regulatory implications arising from our
findings.
5.3.1 Cross-jurisdictional data flow. As explained in Section
2.2.3, the rules regarding transfers of data outside the EU under the
8The principles behind the criteria used here are discussed in the aforementioned prior
works
GDPR are similar to the previous regime (under the Data Protection
Directive), but with some new details as well as larger associated
fines. In so far as these developments result in more investigation
and enforcement by authorities, the impact will be different for
companies depending on their jurisdiction. There will be no impact
on those based in the EU, such as Germany (the fifth-most prevalent
country in which trackers are based), who benefit from rules per-
mitting the free flow of data within the Union. Some third countries
such as Canada also benefit from being on the EU Commission’s
list of legal regimes that are deemed ‘adequate’ and therefore data
transfers to trackers in those jurisdictions are legitimate without
further measures in place.
However, amongst the top-10 most prevalent countries there are
several which lie outside the E.U. and are not deemed adequate, such
as China, Russia, Singapore, South Korea and Japan. In order for
transfers to these countries to be legitimate, additional safeguards
must be in place as explained in Section 2.2.3. We cannot determine
whether such arrangements have been put in place by the identified
companies based in non-approved jurisdictions, but our figures
give an indication of the volume of companies to whom these more
onerous rules apply. While the percentages of apps which include
trackers from such jurisdictions are small compared to the US—
China (5.1%), Russia (2.6%), Singapore (2%) versus US (90%)—they
are still significant, numbering in the tens of thousands.
5.3.2 Profiling. The GDPR uses the term ‘profiling’ to describe
any fully or partly automated processing of personal data with the
objective of evaluating personal aspects of a natural person (Article
4(4)). Many of the tracking companies included in our knowledge
base engage in data processing activity that would likely consti-
tute ‘profiling’ under this definition. For instance, the purpose of
many of the most common trackers is behaviourally targeted adver-
tising, whereby individuals are evaluated along demographic and
behavioural dimensions to determine their propensity to respond
to certain marketing messages. Profiling is prohibited if it has ‘le-
gal or significant’ effects on the data subject. While the definition
of ‘significant effects’ is not entirely clear, the Article 29 Work-
ing Party has advised that even profiling for marketing purposes
could potentially give rise to significant effects, including if it is:
intrusive; targets vulnerable, minority groups, or those in financial
difficulty; involves differential pricing; or deprives certain groups
of opportunities.9 Trackers which enable such activities without
consent of the data subject could therefore be in breach of Article
22 (unless such profiling is necessary for entering or performing a
contract, or it is authorised by another member state law). Many of
the most prevalent trackers observed in our study have the capacity
to be used in such ways, and evidence of such practices is begin-
ning to emerge. For instance, DoubleClick (present on 60% of apps
analysed) has been shown to target adverts for higher-paid jobs to
men at a higher rate than to women [12]; while web-based price
discrimination has also been documented by numerous studies in
recent years [19, 26].
5.3.3 Rights and obligations regarding children. Like the old Di-
rective, the GDPR defines certain additional rights and obligations
9Article 29 Working Party: Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making
and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679 http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/
article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=612053
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regarding processing the personal data of children (defined as any-
one under the age of 16, and for certain additional protections, 13).
If a tracker is relying on consent as a legitimating ground for pro-
cessing, then such consent would not be valid from a child under 13;
instead a parent or guardian would need to consent. Furthermore,
as discussed above, Recital 38 states that special protections should
be in place if children’s data are being processed for marketing
and user profiling. This description would likely cover many of the
trackers which are embedded in apps from the Family and Games
& Entertainment genre categories, which are clearly targeted at
children. Problematically, apps from these two genres are especially
exposed to third party tracking, with the average app including
hosts associated with 7 distinct tracker companies for Family apps,
and 6 for Games & Entertainment apps (only News apps are more
exposed). Given the relatively higher level of protection set in the
law regarding profiling children for marketing, it seems that track-
ing is most rampant in the very context in which regulators are
most concerned to constrain it.
6 CONCLUSION
We believe that by undertaking analysis of the distribution of track-
ing technology on close to 1 million smartphone apps, we gain
insight into the breadth and scale of this highly important phenom-
enon. Unlike previous studies whose coverage of apps numbers in
the tens of thousands, and may be skewed towards the app choices
of the users from whom data is gathered, our study is a systematic
analysis of apps on the Play Store.
Our genre-by-genre analysis suggests that there are differences
in the behaviour and distribution of trackers depending on the func-
tionality or purpose the app provides. News and Games apps appear
amongst the worst in terms of the number of tracker companies
associated with them. Tracking is also a substantially trans-national
phenomenon; around 100,000 apps we analysed send data to track-
ers located in more than one jurisdiction.
These findings suggests that there are challenges ahead both
for regulators aiming to enforce the law, and for companies who
intend to comply with it. Full audits of mobile app stores such as this
could help regulators identify areas to focus on. Previous privacy
enforcement ‘sweeps’10 have focused on the most popular apps,
and their terms of service and privacy policies. But the analysis
here suggests that apps may not necessarily be the most efficient
point of analysis; rather, identifying and investigating the most
prevalent trackers might be a better target. Some of the practices
likely to be involved - such as allowing profiling of children without
attempting to obtain parental consent - may be downright unlawful.
It remains to be seen how and if regulators will attempt to detect
and prevent behavioural targeting that has ‘significant effects’ on
data subjects.
The governance of these activities is complex, involving many
stakeholders, including: users, smartphone operating system devel-
opers, equipment manufacturers, alternative app market operators,
app developers, and tracking companies (who also operate multi-
sided markets with advertisers and therefore have the ability to
impose constraints on what ads can be served). Effective regulation
10See https://www.privacyenforcement.net/node/906
will require collaboration between regulators and these myriad
other actors.
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